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LIBEL IN A WILL
INTRODUCTION

Courts have held the right to one's good name in the highest regard
and have protected this right by an action for libel or slander. Where
there is no opposing conflict of the public or the general good, the
courts have been quick to indemnify those whose names and reputations have been blackened wrongfully by others.
Under some circumstances the courts have allowed the blackening
of a person's name, without a corresponding remedy. This occurs
when a testator in his last will includes language that is plainly defamatory and injurious to the good name and reputation of the one mentioned. The problems of whether there can be a cause of action for libel
in a will has been met squarely in only a few appellate decisions.' In
several New York lower court cases,2 the question has been considered
at least obliquely. Despite the relative paucity of judicial authority,
it is not difficult to conjecture that such libelous statements could
increase if the courts do not provide a remedy. It would offer a
convenient instrumentality for the malice of some testators, who
would be thwarted only to the extent that they do not live to see the
results of their testamentary handiwork.
In evaluating the problem of libel in a will there appears to be a
clear split of authority on the question of granting relief in such a
case.
RELIEF DENIED

A cause of action first was denied in the case of Citizens and
Southern National Bank v. Hendricks.s It is interesting to note that
this decision went clearly against the decision of its own lower appellate court 4 and an earlier adjudicated case of neighboring Tennessee.5
The principle ground upon which a cause of action against the estate
was denied was the court's interpretation and application of the ancient
maxim, "actio personalis moritur cum persona" (personal action dies
with the person). The court reasoned that, since the statute dealing
with libel demanded both a writing and a publication and, since the
I See Kleinschmidt v. Matthiew, 200 Ore. -, 266 P.2d 686 (1954); Carver v.
Morrow, 213 S.C. 199, 48 S.E. 2d 814 (1948); Hendricks v. Citizens &
Southern Nat. Bank, 43 Ga. App. 408, 158 S.E. 915 (1931); Citizens &
Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S.E. 313 (1933) ; Nagle
v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 A. 487 (1934); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co.,
128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584 (1914) ; Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N.Y.S.2d
910 (1945) ; In re Gallagher's Estate, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 733.
2 See In re Bomar's Will, 18 N.Y.S. 214 (1892); In re Speiden's Estate, 128
Misc. Rep. 899, 221 N.Y.S. 223 (1926) ; In re Payne's Estate, 160 Misc. 224, 290
N.Y.S. 407 (1926) ; In re Draske's Will, 160 Misc. 587, 290 N.Y.S. 581 (1936);
In re Croker's Will, 201 Misc. 264, 105 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1951).
3 Citizen's & Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, supra note 1.
4 Hendricks v. Citizen's & Southern Nat. Bank, supra note 1.
5 Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., supra note 1.
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writing occurred before the testator's death, the maxim applied and,
hence, there was no cause of action. A necessary and concomitant
factor in this reasoning is the assumption of the court that the executor is not the agent of the testator but rather an agent of the law.
Both the maxim and the agency principle that an agency not coupled
with an interest is terminated by the death of the principal6 were held
applicable.
"A libel for which damages may be recovered as defined in
the Civil Code, §4428, must in the first instance be 'expressed
in print, or writing, or pictures, or signs', and in the second
instance 'publication of the libelous matter is essential to recovery.' Both requirements are mandatory, and they are equally
essential. If the first be accomplished, and the perpetrator dies,
the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona will apply,
with the result that what has been done is but naught. If a
paper executed as a will expresses libelous matter, and the 'act
of the executor in propounding the will is relied on to complete
the offense and afford ground for recovery against the estate,
such reliance must fail, because the testator has died. If it be
said that the act of the executor in propounding the will could
be taken into account, the reply is that the executor was .a
creature or agency of the law to administer the estate, and was
not the testator's representative
in the continuation or consuma' 7
tion of the testator's wrong.
The case of Carver v. Morrow8 reaffirmed the application of the
maxim and the agency principles promulgated in the Hendricks case9
and purported to reply to the obvious argument that justice demands
a cause of action in such circumstances. This was done, not by showing that it is not just, but by showing that justice may be defeated
in the case where a person libels another and then dies.
"It may be said that since there should be a remedy for every
wrong, it would be unjust that one should be allowed to defame
another in his will, and his estate not be held responsible. To
this it may be replied, as stated above, that, even if one in his
lifetime does make and publish a libel in the most offensive
manner which might be imagined, the cause of action will not
survive his death, in which case there will be no remedy for
such wrong. A person who may be defamed in a will is in no
worse position."10
The court further stated that if such a cause of action were allowed,
it would lead to the undesirable result of many law suits.
"It is also to be considered that if a precedent is set in this sort
of case, holding the estate of a deceased person liable for an
6 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

7

§120, (1933); Am. Jux., AGENcy §59.

Citizen's & Southern National Bank v. Hendricks, supra note 1 at p. 315.
8Carver v. Morrow, supra note 1.
9

Citizen's & Southern Nat. Bank v. Hendricks, supra note 1.

10 Carver v. Morrow, supra note 1 at p. 817.
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act which was not completed in his lifetime, but was consummated after his death, the door would be opened to a great
many other different causes of action.""
A third case which considered the problem denied the plaintiff
recovery for his damages, not by denying that he had a cause of action,
but rather by admitting that he had a cause of action, but defeating it
by the affirmative defense of privilege. 12 Although the court speaks
in terms of privilege, it does not distinguish clearly whether it is
speaking in terms of an absolute or a qualified privilege. It appears
from analysis that the court refers to qualified privilege, but there is
no clear showing that this is so:
"A will is the foundation of a judicial proceeding, the administration of the estate in the orphan's court. It is closely analogous to a plaintiff's statement in a civil action in the respect
that it is the beginning of a judicial proceeding. We believe
that the rule which makes the pleadings in a judicial proceeding
absolutely privileged may properly be applied to a will in which
there is no apparent purpose to injure the reputation of anyone,
but merely a purpose to insure the distribution of the testator's
estate to his intended beneficiaries and to protect it from possible claims of persons
whom he does not desire to share in
1'
the distribution.

3

Further the court quotes the following passage with approval:
"One may publish, by speech or writing, whatever he honestly
believes is essential to the protection of his own rights, or to the
rights of another, provided the publication be not unnecessarily
made to others than to those persons whom the publisher
honestly believes can assist him in the protection of his own
rights, nor to others than those whom he honestly believes will,
by reason of knowledge of the matter published, be better
enabled to assert, or to protect from invasion, either their own
rights, or the rights of others entrusted to their guardianship.' 14
It is to be noted that the requisites of a qualified privilege confine its
application to limited fact situations, and, hence, is no general answer
to the problem. In the larger number of cases, there would not be
the necessary requisites' 5 present to qualify the libelous matter as
privileged, and if the defense failed, the original question would arise.
RELIEF

GRANTED

Other courts have allowed a cause of action for libel in a will.
Generally, the basis for relief is that of substantial justice in that a
testator should not be allowed, with malice and forethought, to make
11 Ibid.
12 Nagle v. Nagle, supra note 1.
13 Ibid. at p. 488.

Ibid.
"5See PROSSER, ToRTs (1941) §94;
14

RESTATEMENT,

ToRTs (1938) §§593-598.
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his will a vehicle for wrongfully blackening good names and reputations. The court in the first adjudicated case on the subject,"0 taken
chronologically, states as follows:
"Refusal to grant relief in such cases would amount to denial
of justice and to premium on irresponsible libel. No one would
be safe from the 'slings and arrows of outrageous' malice. It
ought not be permitted that a solemn testamentary disposition
should be made the vehicle of libelous matter.""
In a case' 8 that is usually considered the principal authority for allowing relief the court speaks as follows:
"If relief be denied to this plaintiff in this suit, she is indeed in
bad plight. There is no other way in which she may vindicate
the virtue and integrity of her mother and establish for herself
the position in society which she is entitled to occupy. If relief be denied to her, she, during her lifetime, and her child for
generations, must bear the reproach of the bar sinister. It cannot
be said that the law affords no remedy for a wrong such as the
one perpetrated by this testator."'19
Another concept that is to be considered and which is closely allied
with the idea of substantial justice is the realization that libel in a
will is apt to be peculiarly enduring and to be of relatively greater
permanence than many other libels. The mere'fact that a will becomes
part of the permanent records of probate and records affecting title
to land guarantees this. 2 0 All in all, the courts seem to realize the
great potential for harm in libel in a will because the stigma is
sustained and easily accessible to any who desire to find it or merely
chance to find it.
In deciding the cases that favor the granting of the action, the
courts have tried to refute the reasoning of the cases holding to the
contrary. They hold that the reasoning of the maxim, "actio personalis
moritur curn persona" does not apply because, since publication is
necessary for the tort and this occurs only after death, the cause of
action arises only after death and cannot, therefore, die with the
testator because it did not exist until after his death.2 1 The court in
the Harris case 22 went even further and attacked the maxim itself
by showing its ancient and not particularly honored existence and
implying that it is anachronistic and has outlived its usefulness.
The agency argument was considered in the most recent case on
16 Ii re Gallagher's Estate, supra note 1.
17 Ibid.

18 Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., supra note 1.
19
2 0 Ibid. at p. 587.
In re Gallagher's Estate, supra note 1; Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., supra

note 1.

21 Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., supra note 1.
22 Ibid
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the subject, 23 and the court admitted that under the strict common

law view it would be hard to show how the executor's "agency", since
it was not coupled with an interest, could survive the testator's death.
The court stated that, since the executor had certain duties to perform
before he was by proper process appointed by the court, he did act
for or represent the testator.
"It, therefore, appears that there is a hiatus between the
testator's death and the court appointment of the executor.
During this period when he, or the custodian of the will files
the same with the clerk, he is not acting for the court but necessarily for the deceased. When the testator executes his will he
does the same with full knowledge that the same will be made
public, and although the executor or custodian in such instance
is not what would strictly be called an agent under the common
law rule, yet he is an instrumentality through which the will is
published, and when he does thus act, 24he in effect publishes
the will at the behest of the testator."

The question of privilege was dealt with in Brown v. Mack25 by
demonstrating that the testator had no right to privilege under the
circumstances since he was not a party to the probate proceedings.
Thus far, the arguments brought forth are purely those drawn
from the case law on the subject. It is to be noted that in no case
considered here is any attempt made to predicate liability for the
executor as an individual. It is proper that he should not be liable
because it is the duty of the executor to publish the will under the
statutory law of most states. 26 It is well to note further that none of
the survival statutes come into play 27 since by their very nature the
cause of action comes into existence during the lifetime of the one
whom the cause of action is said to survive. There can be no survival
unless the cause of action occurs before death. The survival statutes
would be relevant if the action were brought for any publication by
the testator before his death. Thus, if there were a survival statute
broad enough to cover libel and slander, as most do not, 28 then it
would be relevant in these jurisdictions that apply the maxim "actio
personalis moritur cum persona." Otherwise it would be irrelevant.
One other category of cases, bearing obliquely on the problem is
that which allows libelous material to be deleted from the will under
circumstances where such material is not necessary for disposition
of the estate and 'could be termed surplus.2 However, this process
Klienschmidt v. Matthiew, supra note 1.
Ibid. at p. 689.
Brown v. Mack, supra note 1.
26 See Wis. STATS. (1953) §310.02.
27 See Wis. STATS. (1953) §331.01.
28 See Wis. STATS. (1953)
§§311.01, 287.01.
29 See cases cited supra note 2.
23
24
25
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could not effect the existence of a cause of action since it only deals
with mitigating the harm done by the publication.
ANALYSIS

AND

CRITICISM

When the cases have been considered and their reasoning analyzed,
the lines of conflict are clearly drawn. The first conflict is that revolving about the maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona." The
courts in favor of the cause of action deny its application since the
cause seeking to be interred cannot he so interred because it had no
existence at the time of the testator's death. If it is assumed that the
maxim does not apply, the problem of who is the tortfeasor arises.
If it is the testator how can he be a tortfeasor after his death? If
it is the estate, how can it be held to be liable for something it did
not do itself but rather was done by the testator, at least as the efficient cause thereof ? The estate itself is sought to be held as an entity,
but only vicariously, for the testator's wrong. Logically it appears that
the testator, by setting in motion the machinery resulting in libel, is the
real tortfeasor. Once it is agreed that he is the tortfeasor, the applicability of the maxim returns as an obstacle to suit.
When one turns to the question of whether the executor is the
agent of the testator, the answer is that the common law cuts off the
agency relationship at the death of the principal. Yet from a common
sense viewpoint, it is apparent that in some way the executor is acting
for the testator since he is directly serving the testator's wishes and
instructions.
Probably the most realistic argument is that to deny relief leads
to injustice, and this logic seems unanswerable. It cannot be denied
that a reputation has been blackened. If this is true, under the fundamental tort premise of indemnity the maligned person should definitely
have a remedy, especially in view of the permanent nature of the
injury inflicted. Those who oppose granting a cause of action do not
question the justice of it but rather attempt to dull the force of this
argument by pointing out analogous situations where justice may be
thwarted, and by raising the argument that to allow such an action
would result in a multiplicity of new causes of action. It is plain that
the first can be refuted by showing that it is actually irrelevant to the
merits of the problem at hand, since it in no way denies the "justice"
argument but only avoids it. The second is irrelevant in that it has no
relation to the merits of the action at hand and, further, the mere
fact that a multiplicity of actions might arise is certainly not a fair
reason for denying a just cause. Eminent authorities in the field of
30
torts admit the just result attained when the cause is allowed.
3o

See Paossui, op. cit., supra p. 814;

HARPER, TORTS, p.

675.
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One other argument raised by text writers is that such a case might
furnish a means of circumventing statutes forbidding bequests and
legacies to certain people.31 In Wisconsin this is not a problem because
there are no such statutes. In those states having such statutes, the
problem can be minimized by the fact that the amount recoverable
in damages by a person in the prohibited class would be negligible
or the publicity of such libel suit would be detrimental to their reputation. Besides, in these special cases recovery could be refused, not
on the ground that no such cause of action exists but on the ground
that it is plainly against public policy to allow the statute to be circumvened where it can be shown that this is the intention. It is to be
noted that no adjudicated case thus far has considered this argument.
Thus, in the final analysis, the problem reduces itself to a clash
of common law principles with the principle of substantial justice.
The lower appellate court faced this issue squarely in the Hendricks
case saying:
"Upon consideration of the question, we find ourselves squarely
facing a choice between two courses; on the one hand the orthodox course of adhering strictly to the rigid rule of the common
law, which in any case of the character of that before us would
do violence to our innate sense of what is fair and right; or.
on the other hand, of falling in line with the constantly changing concepts of the law and its administration, by conforming
with what appears to be a modern doctrine, 'pure drawn from
the fountains of justice.' In the instant case, notwithstanding
our natural aversion to do anything in the nature of 'judicial
legislation', we are impelled, in good conscience, to adopt the
latter alternative. Though the doctrine that we have decided
to follow, it is true, does not seem to be derived from any
ancient legal lore, it has the merit, in our judgment, of being
deep rooted in the moral sense;***.,,-1
It appears difficult to refute this line of reasoning. Clearly a cause
of action should be allowed for libel in a will, in the interests of
justice. Perhaps the courts opposing this view are too firmly committed to their line of reasoning and will not retract in the absence of
legislative enactment. However, this view should be followed in
states, like Wisconsin, where the issue has not been decided. If relief
were allowed, lawyers in the drafting of wills would be more able
to insist that their clients keep such irrelevant matter out of their wills.
C. WILLIAM ISAACSON

31

E.g., S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922) §5217; LA. REV. Civ. CODE (Sanders 2nd ed.
1920) §1470.
32 Hendricks v. Citizen's & Southern Nat. Bank, supra note 1.
33 Ibid. at p. 916.

